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Abstract This article argues that big data’s entrepre-
neurial potential is based not only on new technological
developments that allow for the extraction of non-trivial,
new insights out of existing data, but also on an ethical
judgment that often remains implicit: namely the ethical
judgment that those companies that generate these new
insights can legitimately appropriate (the fruits of) these
insights. As a result, the business model of big data com-
panies is essentially founded on a libertarian-inspired
‘finders, keepers’ ethic. The article argues, next, that this
presupposed ‘finder, keepers’ ethic is far from unprob-
lematic and relies itself on multiple unconvincing
assumptions. This leads to the conclusion that the conduct
of companies working with big data might lack ethical
justification.
Keywords Big data  Privacy  Personal data  Finders–
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Introduction
This article1 deals with big data’s entrepreneurial potential.
With the arrival of big data, data are often lauded as ‘the
new oil’ or as ‘goldmine’ from which ‘nuggets of gold’ can
be retrieved (e.g. World Economic Forum 2011; Chen et al.
2012: 1167; McAfee and Brynjolfsson 2012: 59; Kroes
2013; Mayer-Scho¨nberger and Cukier 2013: 16). Advanced
data mining techniques allow companies2 to generate non-
trivial new insights out of existing data. Since collecting
more data always translates itself into more potential new
insights waiting to be extracted from the data, data hun-
griness is a structural condition of the big data world we
have come to inhabit. This observation already goes a long
way in explaining why many privacy worries are raised in
the context of big data. In this article, I take these privacy
worries as a point of departure, but I focus on the conduct
of big data companies and, more specifically, on some of
the fundamental assumptions underlying their conduct and
that have remained implicit thus far.
Looking at the conduct of typical big data companies such
as Acxiom, Bloomreach, Lotame, Palantir, Google, APT,
Facebook, and Marketshare, we see that their success is
largely dependent on their ability to generate new, non-
trivial insights out of existing data. APT, for instance,
mentions on its website that it offers ‘‘a cloud-based software
application that efficiently analyzes promotional and finan-
cial data to generate actionable insights’’.3 In a similar vein,
Lotame claims that their ‘‘industry-leading analytics tools
built into Lotame’s Data Management Platform (DMP)
enable you to uncover new insights’’.4 Besides this ability to
create new insights (and one may even say new data) out of
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existing data, the business model of companies such as the ones
mentioned is also premised on the fact that creators of these
new insights mayappropriate these new insights. The question
I want to take up here is whether this ethical judgment is a
legitimate one. Straightforward as it may sound, I argue that the
legitimacy of this act of appropriating newly created insights
essentially depends on the implicit acceptance of a ‘finders,
keepers’ ethic.5 Once this implicit acceptance of a ‘finders,
keepers’ ethic is made explicit, it turns out that this ‘finders,
keepers’ ethic itself depends on various implausible assump-
tions. As a result, it is far from obvious that the business of big
data companies is legitimate from an ethical point of view.
Against the background of potential threats of big data that
other scholars have formulated (e.g. Crawford and Schultz
2014; Richards and King 2014; Barocas and Selbst 2016), this
analysis could function as an additional basis of critique,
highlighting the problematic normative presuppositions of big
data companies’ entrepreneurial conduct. Ultimately, my
argument may have legal and political consequences con-
cerning the regulation of big data companies.
This article proceeds in four steps. Firstly, the concept of
big data will be introduced. Special attention will be given
to big data’s ability to generate non-trivial new insights out
of existing data. Secondly, the ‘finders, keepers’ ethic will
be introduced and it will be suggested that this ethic can
help us understand the often implicit ethical judgments
used to justify the conduct of big data companies. Thirdly,
three assumptions of the ‘finders, keepers’ ethic will be
addressed and criticized for their implausibility. Fourth and
lastly, conclusions will be drawn on the basis of the pre-
ceding arguments.
Big data
Big data is a notoriously messy concept, so let me first
explain what I take the concept big data to mean before
proceeding. My description here is tentative and does not
do justice to the great variety of academic literature dealing
with big data. I choose to focus only on those aspects of big
data that I need for my argument since my space is limited.
It is clear that the ability to collect and store larger
volumes of data than ever before is a driving force behind
the phenomenon of big data. This does not mean, however,
that what makes big data big is simply a certain, large
enough, volume of data. The transition from data to big
data is not just a quantitative shift, it is a qualitative shift as
well. Big data is not so much about amounts of data, as it is
about thinking about data, dealing with data, and
approaching challenges and opportunities through the eyes
of data. Mayer-Scho¨nberger and Cukier (2013) identify
three major shifts in moving from a ‘normal’ approach to
data to a big data approach to data. The first shift consti-
tutes a focus on creating datasets that approach N = all,
instead of the careful creation of samples that should be
representative of much larger populations. The second shift
constitutes the belief that in order to achieve a (nearly)
N = all dataset, we should allow data from many different
sources, even if the data are of dubious quality, to be
included. In big data contexts, sheer size and volume are
supposed to make up for messiness and low quality data. It
‘‘permit[s] us to loosen up our desire for exactitude’’
(Mayer-Scho¨nberger and Cukier 2013: 13). The third shift
constitutes the abandonment of the ‘‘age-old search for
causality’’ since ‘mere’ correlations suffice (Mayer-
Scho¨nberger and Cukier 2013: 13).
Mayer-Scho¨nberger and Cukier’s convincing description
of big data6 clearly moves beyond a description that focuses
merely on the size of datasets. What is of great importance to
them is the idea that in a big data world more data from
various sources, even sources of dubious quality, combined
in a larger dataset will almost always lead to more powerful
and valuable analyses. This insight leads to a certain ‘data
hungriness’; when doing big data analyses, more data on the
input side is (almost) always preferable. Big data incen-
tivizes data collection, but also data recombination7: ‘‘so-
called big data brings together not only large amounts of
data, but also various types that previously never would have
been considered together’’ (Michael and Miller 2013: 22).
When using a big data approach to a problem, the goal is
not to amass as much data as possible in order to simply
paint an as accurate as possible picture. The goal is to come
up with interesting and unanticipated insights that do not
follow directly from the aggregated data themselves, but
that need to be extracted or generated from them. As
Rubinstein notes, big data ‘‘is best understood as a more
powerful version of knowledge discovery in databases or
data mining, which has been defined as ‘the nontrivial
extraction of implicit, previously unknown, and potentially
useful information from data’’8 (Rubinstein 2013: 76). As
5 A word of caution: I do not claim that big data businesses do in fact
subscribe to a notion of finders–keepers themselves. My claim is that
the ‘finders, keepers’ ethic is a suitable theory to model their conduct
convincingly and to help explain why big data businesses believe that
their conduct is legitimate.
6 The description by Mayer-Scho¨nberger and Cukier that I draw on
here has a somewhat different focus than the often-used description of
big data that is based on the ‘3V’s’: volume, velocity, and variety.
Many authors describe what is new about big data by referring to the
vast increase in available data (volume), the increase in speed at
which data are created, disseminated, and analyzed (velocity), and the
wide variety of data that are combined (variety) (see for instance
McAfee and Brynjolfsson (2012) for such a description of big data).
7 The element of recombination comes close to the above mentioned
‘V’ of variety.
8 Rubinstein quotes Fayyad et al. (1996) here.
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an effect, storing information—even if one is not sure how
useful the data are right now—becomes more and more
interesting. Tene and Polonetsky go even one step further
when they state that ‘‘the big data business model is anti-
thetical to data minimization. It incentivizes collection of
more data for longer periods of time. It is aimed precisely
at those unanticipated secondary uses, the ‘‘crown jewels’’
of big data’’ (Tene and Polonetsky 2013: 259).
Data mining is the technique that can be seen as the big
data analysis technique par excellence.9 As was already
mentioned, it is a technique that is aimed at discovering non-
trivial new insights in existing datasets, insights that cannot
simply be observed in datasets or follow automatically from
datasets, but insights that have to be extracted or generated
since they do not ‘lie at the surface’. Crawford and Schultz
(2014: 107), for example, write that ‘‘Big Data’s analytics
are simply too dynamic and unpredictable to determine if and
when particular information or analyses will become or
generate PII [personally identifiable information]’’. In order
to achieve this extraction or generating10 of new, emergent
data, a combination of complex algorithms and brute com-
puting force are used to work on the data.
The fact that we can discover new knowledge in existing
data by using data mining techniques goes a long way in
explaining why big data is a phenomenon that attracts so
much attention. It surrounds big data with an aura of
entrepreneurship. Since ‘‘by its very nature, big data analysis
seeks surprising correlations and produces results that resist
prediction’’ (Tene and Polonetsky 2013: 261), it always
remains an open question what new information will be
found and who will find it at what time. Entrepreneurs who
work with big data hope that they will be the first to awaken
the dormant value that lies hidden in big data datasets. The
often used metaphors of data as the new oil and of datasets as
goldmines with nuggets of gold hidden inside those datasets
are expressions of this entrepreneurial potential.
Finders–keepers
In the previous section I have argued that from a technical
perspective, big data’s entrepreneurial potential resides in
the fact that advanced data mining techniques can
extract/generate unanticipated, non-trivial, new, and
(commercially) interesting insights. In this section I want to
shift the focus to the domain of ethics. Big data’s entre-
preneurial potential is equally dependent on the legitimacy
of the appropriation of these newly extracted/generated
insights by commercial parties. If companies cannot
legitimately appropriate their newly mined insights, big
data’s attractiveness (from the perspective of companies)
drastically declines or even evaporates completely. This
question of legitimate appropriation is ultimately and eth-
ical judgment that relies on substantial normative
assumptions that can and should be scrutinized.
In the following paragraphs I will reconstruct the
‘finders, keepers’ ethic as Israel M. Kirzner (1978) has
formulated it. This will help us to better understand the
presupposed ethic of big data business. With the help of
Kirnzer’s theory I will bring to the fore the notion of
finders–keepers that appears to legitimatize the appropria-
tion of newly generated insights by big data companies. In
the next section, I will problematize the normative
assumptions of finders–keepers in big data contexts.
Kirzner (1978: 9) searches for what he calls the ‘‘morality
of the entrepreneurial role’’ as he sees himself confronted
with the challenge of justifying the appropriation by entre-
preneurs of profits that are derived from either new appli-
cations or clever new uses of properties of existing goods. He
proposes to resolve this challenge by accepting both ‘‘a
particular ethical judgment’’ and ‘‘a particular economic
insight’’ (Kirzner 1978: 17). The economic insight
is that which permits us to perceive the discovery of a
hitherto unknown market use for an already owned
resource or commodity as the discovery of (and
consequently the spontaneous establishment of own-
ership in) a hitherto un-owned element associated
with that resource or commodity (Kirzner 1978: 17).
The ethical judgment is the acceptance of a ‘finders,
keepers’ ethic. This means precisely what it appears to
mean: those who find something that is not held by
anybody, are, as they found it, the legitimate owners of that
which they have discovered. Kirzner, however, proposes to
reconceptualize what discovering something that was
previously unheld means. ‘‘In order to introduce plausibil-
ity to the notion of finders–keepers, it appears necessary to
adopt the view that, until a resource has been discovered, it
has not, in the sense relevant to the rights of access and
common use, existed at all’’ (Kirzner 1978: 17). This in
effect means that, under Kirzner’s reconceptualization, the
discoverer of an unheld resource, brings the resource into
existence and must therefore be seen as the creator11 of the
9 Barocas and Selbst (2016), for example, seem to use the concepts
‘data mining’ and ‘big data’ almost interchangeably.
10 From here on out I will use ‘extracting new insights’ and
‘generating new insights’ interchangeably. Ontologically speaking,
one could make a difference between, on the one hand, extracting
something that is already latently present but has remained ‘under the
surface’ thus far, and, on the other hand, generating new insights ex
nihilo. Although an interesting topic in its own right, I propose that
either interpretation is compatible with my argument.
11 ‘‘We see the entrepreneur as ‘‘creator’’ not in the sense of the
physical producer, but strictly in the sense of his being the discoverer
of an available opportunity’’ (Kirzner 1978: 19).
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resource. This is a significant reconceptualization since
creation is a substantially different act than acquisition
from nature. The latter occurs ‘‘against the background of a
given unheld resources (even if no one is aware of their
very existence)’’ (Kirzner 1978: 18), meaning that acqui-
sition constitutes a transfer, namely from nature to the
discoverer who becomes the first holder. The justness of
the transfer could then be subject to ethical scrutiny. In the
case of creation, no notion of transfer is involved in the
establishment of ownership over the created good: ‘‘the
finder-creator has spontaneously generated hitherto non-
existent resources, and is seen, therefore, as their natural
owner’’ (Kirzner 1978: 18). If the finder has created the
goods by finding them, they cannot transfer from nature to
the finder for the simple fact that the goods did not exist, in
the relevant sense, in nature before they were found.12
Entrepreneurs, however, do not—or not exclusively—
appropriate unheld resources, but also acquire held
resources via just transfers, apply an entrepreneurial insight
to create more commercial value, and then profit from
these improvements. Those are two different situations,
although the way they have to be understood according to
Kirzner will turn out to be remarkably similar.
Entrepreneurs’ main activity consists in finding and
exploiting market opportunities, and this usually happens
when they discover a new marketable property or appli-
cation of a known and held resource or commodity.
According to Kirzner, the ‘economic insight’ still applies in
this case: ‘‘the discovery of a hitherto unknown market use
for an already-owned resource or commodity constitutes
the discovery of a hitherto un-owned element associated
with that resource or commodity’’ (Kirzner 1978: 18). Put
differently, the owner of a resource can only be the owner
of those properties and potential applications of a resource
that the owner is explicitly aware of. This is in stark con-
trast to the view that ownership means ownership of all a
resource’s or commodity’s properties and applications,
even the latent ones that have yet to be discovered.
To help us better understand the connection between
Kirzner’s theory and big data entrepreneurship, it may be
instructive to introduce an example at this point (one that I
borrowed from Kirzner): the example of oranges and
orange juice. Image an entrepreneur who can buy oranges
on the market for €5, who knows she can convert those
oranges into orange juice for €4 (costs of the conversion
process of oranges to orange juice), and who also knows
that consumers on the market are willing to pay €12 for the
orange juice. The entrepreneur who discovers this market
opportunity13 can make a nice profit of
(€12 - (€5 ? €4)) = €3. The idea here is that the entre-
preneur has created—ex nihilo—the new use for oranges
and has therefore created the additional value of €3. In
other words, the additional value of €3 was not, in any
relevant sense, present in the oranges before the entrepre-
neur’s intervention. This also means that the newly created
value was not transferred from the original holder of the
oranges to the entrepreneur, since this created value came
into existence after the entrepreneur acquired the oranges
and applied her insights to the product.
Now, Kirzner’s answer to the question whether the
appropriation of the fruits of the entrepreneurial insights is
just, is simple. Exactly because we are dealing with ex
nihilo creation by the entrepreneur after the initial trans-
action, ‘‘this additional $3 value may well be held never to
have been possessed by the seller at all’’ (Kirzner 1978:
20). That part of the transaction which allows the entre-
preneur to be an entrepreneur was, properly speaking,
never part of the transaction. The concept transaction
implies that the element of the good that is exploited by the
entrepreneur to allow for her profitable insight was first
held by the original holder and later, after the transaction,
by the entrepreneur. But this is not the case, because the
entrepreneur created the additional value ex nihilo, mean-
ing that the initial seller never possessed it to begin with.
As a result, Kirzner concludes that ‘‘justice requires that
the ‘‘creator’’ be recognized as the owner of what he has
‘‘created’’: to deny the ‘‘creator’’ title would be to inflict
injustice on him’’ (Kirzner 1978: 24).
Big data and finders–keepers
My claim now is that this notion of finders–keepers appears
to be presupposed by those companies working with big
data. These companies use, just like the orange juice
entrepreneur, specific resources to create something new
out of these resources. In the case of big data, (personal)
data are used to extract non-trivial new information out of
the given data via the technique of (predictive) data min-
ing. The big data entrepreneurs then appropriate the (fruits
of) the newly discovered insights. It is the ‘gold’ that is so
emphasized by commentators. And just like in the case of
12 The reader should note, however, that according to Kirzner finders–
keepers does not fit every single case; there are legitimate cases of
acquisition from nature (as opposed to creation), namely cases in which
everyone is fully aware of the existence of the resource or goods.
Kirzner’s example to illustrate such cases: ‘‘The first man to land on
Mars can hardly claim title to it as its ‘‘creator.’’ In order to establish just
ownership in an unheld resource the existence of which everyone is
fully aware, it is certainly necessary to follow the criteria considered
appropriate to just acquisition from nature’’ (Kirzner 1978: 18).
13 Notice that one does not need to assume that the entrepreneur is
the first to discover that there is juice in an orange. One only needs to
acknowlegde that the entrepreneur discovered the market opportunity
of squeezing the juice out of the orange and selling it for a profit.
28 M. Sax
123
the oranges, we can ask whether the big data entrepreneur
can legitimately appropriate (the fruits of) these new
insights. Kirzner’s answer can still apply here. As long as
the big data entrepreneur gets a hold of the original (per-
sonal) data in a just way, the entrepreneur is free to apply
entrepreneurial insights and appropriate the additional
value that she creates. Indeed, justice even requires that the
entrepreneur is the legitimate owner of these new insights
that are extracted/generated from the original data by the
entrepreneur. Just like the original holder of the oranges
was never the owner of the property of the oranges that
allowed the entrepreneur to make orange juice out of the
oranges, so the data subjects, whose data are used, were
never the owners of those valuable insights that lie hidden
in the data and that the big data entrepreneurs manage to
extract. The data subjects providing the data cannot, in
providing the data, be explicitly aware of the specific
valuable insights that are hidden in their data. To see why,
remember that these insights are in fact new non-trivial
data, created out of the original data. The very nature of
big data analysis is such that the newly mined insights do
not follow directly from the original data, meaning that the
original data subjects cannot, by definition, be aware of
what emergent data can be extracted/generated from their
personal data prior to the actual extraction via data mining.
Due to this lack of explicit knowledge of all the unpre-
dictable new insights that can be extracted from their
personal data, the original data subjects can, under the
‘finders, keepers’ ethic, not be seen as the legitimate
owners of these newly mined insights. The big data com-
panies are the finders-creators of these new insights and
their appropriation of the fruits of these new insights is
therefore legitimate when the ‘finders, keepers’ ethic is
accepted.
Problematic assumptions of finders–keepers in big
data contexts
In the previous section I have argued that big data com-
panies must presuppose a ‘finders, keepers’ ethic to explain
why their appropriation of the new, valuable insights they
manage to extract out of existing (personal) data can be
seen as legitimate. In this section I will describe, in a very
tentative manner, three assumptions of the ‘finders, keep-
ers’ ethic that are especially problematic in big data con-
texts: (1) the presumed ‘divisibility’ of personal data; (2)
the legitimacy of the original acquisition of personal data;
and (3) the historical conception of justice that underlies
finders–keepers. All three assumptions are problematic due
to their insensitivity to the specificity of what kind of things
personal data are and the functioning of personal data in
big data contexts. As the discussion of these problematic
assumptions shows, explicating the normative basis of big
data entrepreneurship allows for new types of critique on
the conduct of big data companies.
Divisibility of personal data
As I have argued, the ‘finders, keepers’ ethic depends on
the idea that within the same goods, some of the properties
can be owned by the original holder, while other properties,
namely those allowing for applications the original holder
is not explicitly aware of, are unheld at the very same time
and can thus, after discovery, be appropriated by the finder-
creator. This introduces a certain kind of divisibility to
goods which is necessary for finders-keepers to function
adequately. In the case of inanimate objects this theory
may be plausible—although even in those cases the
divisibility of objects might feel highly artificial. But even
if we assume, for the sake of argument, that this divisibility
is plausible and accepted by everyone in the case of
inanimate objects, it still does not follow that it is, by
extension, equally plausible to think of personal data in a
similar fashion. Granted, we often do speak of personal
data as something—a resource, a thing—that can be
owned, but does that automatically mean that personal data
are to be understood as nothing more than inanimate
objects?
I believe that the relationship between a person and her
data is not exactly the same as the relationship between a
person and a quotidian object (a phone, an orange, etc.) she
owns. Floridi expresses this suspicion very accurately:
[O]ne may still argue that an agent ‘‘owns’’ his or her
information, […] in the precise sense in which an
agent is her or his information. ‘‘My’’ in ‘‘my infor-
mation’’ is not the same ‘‘my’’ as in ‘‘my car’’ but
rather the same ‘‘my’’ as in ‘‘my body’’ or ‘‘my
feelings’’: it expresses a sense of constitutive be-
longing, not of external ownership, a sense in which
my body, my feelings and my information are part of
me but are not my (legal) possession (Floridi 2005:
195).
If we understand the relation between an individual and
her personal data the way Floridi does, it becomes imme-
diately clear that it is far from unproblematic to conceive of
personal data as if they were like oranges and orange juice.
If Floridi’s understanding of personal data is plausible, and
I believe it is, then it can explain why the idea of divisi-
bility—something finders–keepers needs—is much less
convincing in relation to personal data than it is in relation
to inanimate objects. Floridi notes that the ‘my’ in ‘my
information’ ‘‘expresses a sense of constitutive belonging’’
(Floridi 2005: 195). This remark expresses the idea that
your identity as a person is always necessarily
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constituted—at least partly—by your information (either
information about you, or information that you happen to
‘possess’), seeing the person ‘‘as an informational entity’’
(Floridi 2005: 194) or ‘‘the nature of a person as being
constituted by that person’s information’’ (Floridi 2005:
195). This, in effect, means that unwanted meddling with
one’s personal data constitutes ‘‘changes in one’s own
identity as an informational entity’’ (Floridi 2005: 195).
Based on Floridi’s characterization of personal data, one
could argue that thinking about personal data exactly like
one thinks of oranges is to make a category mistake.14 As
an effect, additional arguments are needed to extend this
idea of divisibility from inanimate objects to personal data.
At this point, the objection might be raised that big data
analyses do not even need personal data to be effective.
Completely anonymized data can also do the trick in some
instances. If this is the case, the objector could claim that
my argument, which is based on the ‘specialness’ of per-
sonal data, fails. In response, I would like to draw attention
to different ways to define and understand the term ‘per-
sonal data’. An often-used definition is the one found in the
European Union’s Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC),
namely ‘‘any information relating to an identified or iden-
tifiable natural person’’ (article 2 (a)). This definition hin-
ges on the question whether a piece of information or data
can be explicitly related back to a person. If this standard
definition is adopted, my argument my indeed seem dubi-
ous. However, in light of Floridi’s remarks and big data’s
ability to generate inherently unpredictable outcomes that
can influence the standing of data subjects significantly, I
would like to suggest that a broader notion of personal data
is appropriate. Even data that cannot be directly related to
natural persons can be used, in big data contexts, to gen-
erate insights that can nonetheless have a significant impact
on the lives and self-understanding of persons. Think for
instance of discriminatory targeting practices as described
by Turow (2011) that need not necessarily be based on
personal data in the legal sense of the word to still have
those discriminatory effects. I want to propose that in those
cases where, legally speaking, anonymized and therefore
non-personal data are used, there is still something personal
about the data in a moral sense. Because these data can still
have a significant influence on the lives and self-under-
standings of persons and are, seen from this perspective,
still constitutive of personhood, I believe it makes sense to
say that these data are still, in a moral sense, personal. As a
result, it is still unconvincing to assume, without argument,
that these data can be treated as just any quotidian object.
Acquisition of personal data
The acquisition of personal data—understood in the broader
sense advocated above—by big data companies has not been
problematized thus far. It has simply been assumed that big
data companies acquire personal data in a just manner on the
market, by way of transactions based on mutual consent. The
idea that personal data are usually acquired in a just manner
by big data companies because individuals consent to it may
seem plausible. In reality, however, this position is quite hard
to maintain. The idea that these transactions of personal data
are based on informed consent, and that this informed con-
sent is truly informed consent, is not very convincing in the
face of the apparent failures of the informed consent model.
Zuiderveen Borgesius (2014) investigates the actual
functioning of the informed consent model for the place-
ment of cookies on computers and concludes that informed
consent mechanisms are not strong enough to protect
individuals. In a similar vein, Hoofnagle and Urban (2014)
contend that informed consent mechanisms assume man to
be a pure homo economicus: ‘‘Companies, long encour-
aged by regulators, issue privacy policies for consumers to
read and act upon. In theory, consumers read these notices
and make decisions according to their overall preferences,
including preferences about privacy, price, service offer-
ing, and other attributes’’ (Hoofnagle and Urban 2014:
261–262). But for informed consent to function properly,
this model of man as a perfect homo economicus must be
somewhat adequate, and it is far from obvious that it is.
Solove (2013: 1883) calls this informed consent based
approach ‘privacy self-management’ and states that ‘‘em-
pirical evidence and social science literature demonstrates
that people’s actual ability to make such informed and
rational decisions does not even come close to the vision
contemplated by privacy self-management’’.
The problems of the informed consent model can poten-
tially erode the legitimacy of the original acquisition of the
personal data that are used by big data companies. This, in
turn, raises the question whether the appropriation of newly
mined insights can be just if the data entrepreneurs work with
to generate these insights were not acquired justly.
Historical conception of justice
Finders–keepers presupposes a historical conception of
justice (Kirzner 1978: 9). A clear formulation of this his-
torical conception can be found in Nozick (1974:
151–153). A historical conception of justice evaluates
outcomes by focusing exclusively on two questions: (1)
was the original acquisition just, and (2) were all the
subsequent transfers just. If both conditions are satisfied,
then outcomes must necessarily be just. As an effect, out-
comes cannot be evaluated in their own right.
14 This line of reasoning can be extend even further. The category
mistake is also the foundation of the idea that personal data can be
understood and treated as commodities. However, treating personal
data as mere commodities is highly problematic from a moral point of
view (see Roessler (2015) for such an analysis).
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This conception of justice is problematic in big data
contexts since an exclusive focus on the original acquisi-
tion of data and the subsequent transfers of data does not
allow us to deal adequately with the challenges big data
presents us with. To see why, one should notice that the
current model of ‘‘[p]rivacy self-management addresses
privacy in a series of isolated transactions guided by par-
ticular individuals. Privacy costs and benefits, however, are
more appropriately assessed cumulatively and holistically’’
(Solove 2013: 1881). As was already shown, one of the
unique aspects of big data is that outcomes are inherently
unpredictable. Therefore, an exclusive focus on individual
transactions, without focus on the actual aggregated out-
comes these transactions can lead to, will necessarily miss
something important. An historical conception of justice
neglects data subjects’ structural inability—and the general
impossibility—to foresee the future outcomes of data
mining. Not being able to evaluate these unpre-
dictable outcomes in their own right is a serious problem
for any analysis of big data that wants to focus on the
desirability of certain applications and their outcomes.
Conclusion
In this article I have suggested that if one observes the ways in
which big data companies work with data, an implicitly pre-
supposed ‘finders, keepers’ ethic can be uncovered. This ethic
serves the purpose of legitimizing the appropriation of newly
mined, potentially profitable insights by these big data com-
panies. However, because this hidden normative manipulative
basis of big data entrepreneurship has remained implicit thus
far, no explicit arguments have been provided in favor of it.
This is problematic, for the plausibility of finders–keepers in
the context of big data is far from self-evident. The assumption
that just because a company has managed to extract new
insights out of existing data warrants the appropriation and use
of these insights, disregards a whole range of vital questions
about the nature of personal data and the way these data can
have a serious impact on the lives of people. As a result, this
article suggests that the practices of big data companies by
which they generate new insights out of existing personal data
lack ample justification and should be subject to more intense
ethical scrutiny.
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